九鬼周造と輪廻の思想 : 《時間》に関する九鬼の講話を戦間期思潮の文脈の中で再考する by Shigemi INAGA
Kuki Shuzo and the Idea of Metempsychosis :
Recontextualizing Kuki's Lecture on Time in





Japan review : Journal of the International










Japan Review 31 (2017): 105–122
Kuki Shūzō and the Idea of Metempsychosis: 
Recontextualizing Kuki’s Lecture on Time in the 
Intellectual Milieu Between the Two World Wars1
INAGA Shigemi 
Shortly before his departure from Europe, Kuki Shūzō held two public 
conferences at the Pontigny gathering of philosophers in 1928. One of the 
themes he addressed in one of them was the “Oriental” notion of time. It was 
not until recently, however, that the meaning of this presentation, which was 
given in French, was seriously taken into account by philosophy scholars in 
Japan.
 This paper will first show the significance of the idea of “metempsychosis” 
in modern intellectual history between 1890 and 1930, and then focus on 
how Kuki presented it. In closing, this paper will consider the relevance 
of Kuki’s proposal from a fresh perspective. His ref lections shed light on 
the metaphysical relevance of the idea of metempsychosis. Despite its basic 
incompatibility with Christian doctrine, the idea of metempsychosis opens 
up to us a new insight into the spiritual dimension of the world.
 Far from being a simple case of superstition, the idea of metempsychosis 
may suggest a rational way of radically redef ining individuality and 
multiplicity in subject-formation, which Kuki was aiming to do on the fringes 
of theosophical thought in the global context of the late 1920s.2 The paper 
has no pretention to be a philosophical treatise or a philological study of Kuki 
Shūzō’s philosophy. Rather than demonstrating any linear connections with 
theosophy, it tentatively circumnavigates and maps, searching for a potential 
intellectual web concocted around the idea of “metempsychosis.”
1 This paper was originally presented as “Kuki Shūzō and the Idea of Metempsychosis: On the Fringe of 
Theosophical Thinking?” at the international conference “Theosophy Across Boundaries” (Heidelberg Center 
for American Studies, Curt und Heidemarie Engelhorn Palais, Heidelberg, Germany, 24–26 September, 
2015). The author would like to thank Hans-Martin Krämer for the invitation to this symposium. The author 
also thanks Dylan Luers Toda for manuscript editing as well as two anonymous peer reviewers who provided 
insightful and careful comments on the original draft.
2 On theosophy per se and its resonances across cultural boundaries, refer to the post-conference publication 
of the above-mentioned international symposium (note 1 above). In this paper, I will refrain from providing 
any further explanation of theosophy and its ramifications in Japan and elsewhere. Suffice it to note, however, 
that in theosophy the idea of metempsychosis plays an important role, and that Kuki’s hereafter-analyzed 
discussions are worth being treated in parallel as a constituent part of 1920s intellectual history. I believe that 
Okakura and Mishima, who have not been treated in connection with Kuki, can help elucidate his position in 
the intellectual milieu of the time. 
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Introduction
Kuki Shūzō 九鬼周造 (1888–1941) is best remembered for his “Iki” no kōzō 「いき」の
構造 (Structure of Iki, 1930). His Gūzensei no mondai 偶然性の問題 (The Problem of 
Contingency; 1935) was translated into French by Omodaka Hisataka 澤瀉久孝. In 
this paper, however, I will consider his lesser known papers, focusing on the notion of 
metempsychosis. By so doing, I aim to demonstrate tentatively the relevance of Kuki’s 
reflections on this idea in the intellectual milieu of the era.3 His metaphysical preoccupation 
with the idea of reincarnation has also begun to attract academic attention in recent studies 
on Japanese philosophy.4 In this context I hope to contribute modestly to our understanding 
of the encounter between Western and Eastern ideas from the hindsight provided by an 
intellectual history perspective.
One circumstantial reason that I am considering Kuki is that his name is engraved 
in the intellectual history of the university town of Heidelberg: when he was staying in 
Heidelberg, he asked Heinrich Rickert to teach him personally at home. Furthermore, 
Eugene Herrigel was Kuki’s tutor, and Jean-Paul Sartre later became his French tutor when 
he was in Paris, where he met Henri Bergson and Leon Brunschvicg. I omit Kuki Shūzō’s 
bibliographical details, as one can easily access them. Indeed, Kuki is one of the rare 
Japanese philosophers whose main writings are available in major European languages. I 
would also like to mention here that le Baron Kuki jokingly explained to Rickert that his 
name means in German “Neun Teufel” (that is, nine demons), a fact that will be relevant 
later.
1. From Okakura to Kuki
Shortly before his permanent return to Japan after spending more than eight years in 
Europe, Kuki delivered two lectures in French at Pontigny, on the outskirts of Paris, in 
1928. Let us begin with his second lecture: “L’expression de l’infini dans l’art japonais.” 5 
Kuki’s text begins with a citation from the book by Okakura Kakuzō (Tenshin) 岡倉覚三 
(天心) entitled The Ideals of the Orient (translated into French as Les Ideaux de l’Orient 
in 1917): “l’histoire de l’art japonais devient l’histoire des idéaux asiatiques.” 6 Okakura’s 
original in English states, “The history of Japanese art becomes thus the history of Asiatic 
3 Sakabe (1990, pp. 109–34) is one of the few scholars who has discussed the importance of Kuki’s Pontiny 
lecture. However, he does not fully develop its potential, as Furukawa (2017, pp. 129–40) and Mori (2017, 
pp. 118–19) critically point out. Indeed, Sakabe does not take the idea of metempsychosis into account in his 
paper. (He does, however, provide a fine analysis of “possession” in Sakabe 1988.) 
4 Since the above-mentioned symposium and the submission of this paper, two special issues on Kuki have been 
published in periodicals in philosophy: “Kuki, Contingence, Iki and Time” in Gendai shisō 現代思想 44:23 
(January 2017), and also “Kuki Shūzō” in Risō 理想 698 (2017). Several papers in these volumes converge with 
the interest of the present paper. While relevant observations are referred to in the notes, I have refrained from 
modifying my argument, as the present paper was prepared prior to the publication of these two special issues.
5 “The Expression of Infinitude in Japanese Art” (Kuki 1928). Refer to Obama (2012) and Obama (2013) for a 
detailed analysis of these texts. Here I will not provide a full explanation of this lecture.
6 Okakura 1917, p. 36.
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ideals, the beach where each successive wave of Eastern thought has left its sand-ripple as it 
beat against the national consciousness.” 7
Though Kuki does note quote from the following phrase, Okakura continues: “Yet I 
linger with dismay on the threshold of an attempt to make an intelligible summary of those 
art-ideals. For art, like the diamond net of Indra, reflects the whole chain in every link.” 
Obviously, Okakura is referring to the metaphor of the “infinite net” found in the Huayan 
Sutra (Ch. Huayanjing 華厳経; Jp. Kegongyō). Each jewel that composes the whole garland 
reflects and is reflected by every other jewel, which extends to the infinity, in space as well as 
in time. We shall see that the same metaphor is also alive in Kuki’s two lectures.
Also noteworthy is the fact that in a previous paragraph Okakura states, “Thus Japan 
is a museum of Asiatic civilizations; and yet more than a museum, because the singular 
genius of the race leads it to dwell on all phases of the ideals of the past, in the spirit of 
living Advaitism which welcomes the new without losing the old.” 8 Three remarks must 
be made. First, the idea of advaita or non-duality comes from Shankar, and was renewed 
by Vivekananda in the footsteps of Ramakrishna as part of modern neo-Hinduism reform. 
Second, at the same time the same principle of advaita is already evident in the esoteric 
Shingon 真言 Buddhism propagated by Kūkai 空海 in ninth century Japan, to which 
Okakura has been closely linked.9 In one of his books, Shōryōshū 性霊集, Kūkai asks how 
mosquitos, worms, and serpents could not have Buddha-nature (gigyō zendō nanzo busshō 
nakaran 蚑行蠕動なんぞ仏性なからん). Here is an implicit statement of advaita: he claims 
that all these creatures share the same Buddha-nature, and that there is not any duality 
between them. Third, this quote from Okakura already anticipates the outline of another 
Kuki lecture on the “Oriental” notion of time. Indeed, “welcoming the new without losing 
the old” is a key concept for his reflection on “transmigration,” or temps identique qui se 
répète à perpetuité (identical time which repeats itself in perpetuity), as we shall see soon.
Incidentally, there was a rumor that Kuki Shūzō’s real father was Okakura. Though 
this is not biologically true, Okakura’s love affair with Kuki Ryūichi’s 九鬼隆一 wife, Hatsu 
波津, was a well-known scandal, which lead to Okakura’s forced resignation from all the 
positions he was occupying as a high ranking civil servant, including director of the Tokyo 
School of Fine Arts. Kuki’s mother would die in a mental hospital in 1931. Kuki as a child 
did remember Okakura well. Whenever Kuki visited his mother, Okakura, with his red 
drunken face, delightfully embraced the boy.10 In a sense, Kuki was the spiritual son of 
Okakura. Let us briefly investigate this spiritual tie that connects the two eminent thinkers 
to which Japan’s modernity gave birth.
 7 Okakura 2007, p. 13. 
 8 Okakura 2007, p. 12. On this statement and its connection with the idea of advaita, see Inaga 2014, 
pp. 138–40.
 9 See, for example, Shinohara 2012. However, Shinohara does not directly mention Okakura in this book. See 
especially pp. 151–61. Gigyō zendō is usually understood as a conventional Buddhist expression referring to “all 
sentient beings.” However, here I have restored its etymological meaning according to the original Chinese 
characters. The connection between non-duality and metempsychosis obviously needs further consideration, 
which would require a book-length study. On the interconnectedness of entities in the universe, see Inaga 
2016, part I, chapter 1. Regarding the philological critique of the idea in Japanese thought that Buddha-
nature is universal, see Sueki 2015.




This brings us to another lecture by Kuki Shūzō, delivered one week earlier: “la notion du 
temps et la reprise sur le temps en Orient” (“The Notion of Time and the Recurrence of 
Time in the Orient”).11 Its main topic is the notion of the “transmigration of the souls.” 
In contrast to Martin Heidegger’s “unité extatique” 12 (that is, transition from the past to 
present and to the future), which Kuki qualifies as “horizontal,” Kuki presents another 
moment of ecstasy which he calls “vertical,” in which the three phases of time are directly 
superimposed: “Each present has identical moments, on the one hand in the future, on the 
other hand in the past; here is an instant the depth of which is infinite” (Chaque présent a 
des moments identiques, d’une part dans l’avenir et d’autre part dans le passé; c’est un instant 
dont l’ épaisseur est d’une profondeur infinite).13 Thus is the definition of “le temps de la 
transmigration,” according to Kuki.14
The recurrence of time is a mystical experience which causes a profound éclat (a 
profound lightning or splitting), “where the ‘I’ recognizes oneself with shuddering 
astonishment-fissure” (où le moi se reconnaît lui-même avec un étonnement frémissant). 
“The ‘I’ exists and at the same time it does not exist” (Le moi existe en même temps que le 
moi n’existe pas).15 We can easily recall here a phrase in the “Art Appreciation” chapter of 
Okakura’s famous Book of Tea (1964): “At once he is and is not.” In a moment of ecstasy in 
art appreciation, the beholder at once does exist and does not or no longer exist. “He catches 
a glimpse of Infinity, but words cannot voice his delight, for the eye has no tongue. Freed 
from fetters of matter, his spirit moves in the rhythm of things.” 16 To this ecstasy Kuki gives 
an etymological explanation of “being out of oneself” (d’ être hors de soi), clearly referring to 
Heidegger’s Dasein analysis of “ex-ist-ire” in Sein und Zeit, published shortly earlier in 1927.
In one of his Chinese poems, Okakura describes this experience of enthusiasm as 
follows: “When one contemplates the Thing, the self is already lost; The spirit of the 
star vibrates the autumnal sword, And the frozen heart breaks the jade bowl” (mono ni 
kanzureba tsui ni ware nashi / seiki shūken o yurugase / hyōshin gyokko o saku 物ニ観ヅレバ
竟ニ吾無シ/星気秋剣ヲ揺ガセ/氷心玉壺ヲ裂ク).17 The common use of the terms, like 
éclatement and étonnement frémissant, shows the strong affinity between the two authors. 
Here the term “enthusiasm” must be taken literally in Greek definition: possessed by a 
god—“theos.” The ecstasy in artistic appreciation spoken of by Okakura is retranslated by 
Kuki into that of the encounter with one’s own past in the process of the transmigration of 
the soul (Jp. rinne tenshō 輪廻転生). To the best of my knowledge, nobody has pointed out 
this similarity between the two thinkers. Perhaps we could see here a kind of transmigration 
of ideas which takes place from Okakura, the father, to Kuki, the son. 
11 “La notion du temps et la reprise sur le temps en Orient.” Reprinted as Kuki 1928. (We have followed the 
capitalization of the French original, while the capitalization in English follows the style of Japan Review).
12 Kuki notes that the term comes from Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 329. On Kuki’s interpretation 
and criticism of Heidegger’s idea of “ecstasy” and the latter’s response to the former, refer to Sakabe 1990, 
pp. 116–18; Takada 2002; Mori 2017, pp. 129–30; Kioka 2017, pp. 203–208; and Mine 2017, pp. 35–37.
13 KSZ, vol. 1, p. 58.
14 KSZ, vol. 1, p. 59.
15 KSZ, vol. 1, p. 61.
16 Okakura 1964, p. 45. 
17 Okakura 1905, p. 3. 
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3. Karma and Nirvana
Why is Kuki obsessed by the idea of transmigration, or, to use a Greek term, 
metempsychosis? What are the philosophical or metaphysical implications of his reflection? 
Let us examine Kuki’s discussion on the state of le moi existe et en même temps le moi n’existe 
pas. Immediately after this phrase, Kuki quotes from the famous conversation between King 
Menandar (Milanda) and Nagasena. Is the fire that burns all night the same fire as the day 
before? Or is the light of this fire in the evening not identical with the light in the morning? 
To this question, the king is obliged to reply that the two fires are different but the two 
lights are identical. So long as the two entities are strictly identical, continual burning could 
not take place. Conversely, the light can be held to be identical in this span of time only 
on the condition that the provided fuel is consumed and inevitably replaced.18 The idea of 
identity is guaranteed here by its very loss.
The logic of transmigration is concomitant with this parable. In this story, Kuki 
overlaps the Greek notion of aion with “Grandes Années”/“Great Years” (megas enautos; 
Thimaius-Timaeus, 39D).19 According to this circular calendar, Socrates would once again 
marry Xanthippe in the next turn of the mega-time-span in the Cosmic Period. Yet by their 
next marriage they will have gotten older due to the scale of this mega-time-span, and it 
turns out that Socrates and Xantippe at this time are no longer identical with the previous 
couple. In this discussion, Kuki refers to Friedrich Nietzsche (Zarathoustra is clearly 
mentioned) and implicitly to his idea of Wiederkunft, or eternal return.20
If one believes that one is a reincarnation of one’s precedent self, this very consciousness 
of one’s reincarnation makes one no longer identical with one’s previous self, for the previous 
self could not be aware of the identity of its next reincarnation. Here is the paradox of the 
ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen (eternal return of the same). In other words, transmigration 
or metempsychosis can be realized so long as the concerned agent is not aware of the fact; 
and once one is aware of one’s reincarnation, one can no longer be identical with one’s 
former self.
Thus Kuki insists that there is a contradiction between the notion of karma (Jp. gō 業) 
and that of nirvana (Jp. nehan 涅槃).21 If, indeed, the identity between the precedent self 
and the current self cannot be established in the process of reincarnation, the notion of 
karma itself would no longer be valuable, for there is no guarantee of continuity between 
the two. On the other hand, if the notion of karma were accepted, then, rejecting the 
transmigration of the identical self/selves would be logically indefensible. As Miura 
Toshihiko 三浦俊彦, a scholar of aesthetics and logic, judiciously points out, formal logic 
cannot demonstrate that transmigration is logically impossible, though its logical necessity 
cannot be demonstrated either.22
18 Nakamura and Hayashima 1963–1964.
19 In note 1, Kuki declares that he will not discuss the relationship between transmigration and the cosmic 
period, though he does recognize that the Buddhist idea of kalpa may be identical with the cosmic 
transmigration. KSZ, vol. 1, p. 64 (French), p. 285 (Japanese).
20 KSZ, vol. 1, note 3, p. 64 (French), p. 285 (Japanese). My view regarding this problem is developed in detail 
in Inaga 2016, part I, chapter 4, especially pp. 131–36.




An academic debate was developing on this question in Japan while Kuki was in 
Paris in 1927. A close colleague of Kuki, Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎, in his refutation of 
Kimura Taiken 木村泰賢, insisted on this point, stating that the notion of transmigration 
could not have existed in primitive Buddhism (despite Kimura’s claims), so long as there 
was the doctrine of the non-existence of the self (Jp. muga setsu 無我説). In fact, without 
the guarantee of self-identity via karma, it would be no use to assert the existence of 
transmigration.23 Lack of identity between my previous “self ” and my next “self ” would 
invalidate the notion of eternal return. Yet, by following this logic one may say that inversely 
it is also logically possible to doubt the existence of the “self,” in so far as the notion of “self-
identity” is not reliable enough to sustain the logical probability (or at least logical non-
refutability) of transmigration. (However, Buddhism’s doctrinal debates throughout history 
on the Indian subcontinent did not follow this path.)24
4. Le Mythe de Sisyphe Reinterpreted
Then, how can one realize, that is, put into reality, one’s own transmigration? Replying to 
this question, Kuki proposes not remaining a passive victim of karma but rather becoming 
“a clever magician who creates anew on one’s own account the time itself ” (un habile 
magician qui crée lui-même à nouveau le temps). He continues, “This magician has the tour 
de force or rather tour of will to put an end to his own existence and to be reborn anew. 
Between one’s death and rebirth one’s will probably does not exist in its actuality, but it 
does exist for sure in a state of potentiality” (Alors ce magician dans la solitude absolue est un 
veritable demon (Teufel!!), qui possède le tour de force, ou plutôt tour de volonté, de pouvoir 
terminer son existence et renaître à nouveau. Sans doute, entre sa mort et sa renaissance, sa 
volonté n’existe pas actuellement, elle n’en existe pas moins potentiellement).25
It seems that Kuki here is mainly thinking of tragic heroes in the samurai tradition 
(Boushido-les vois des chevaliers) like Kusunoki Masashige 楠木正成, an historical 
and legendary figure of the fourteenth century, who committed suicide on the defeated 
battlefield so as to be reborn seven times to serve the patria and the emperors in the future 
(shichishō hōkoku 七生報国).26 Yet this rebirth may be also logically applied to the past as 
well: so as to assume the role of a reincarnation in terms of the metempsychosis, one also 
has to claim one’s identity with one’s previous life in the past. This reversibility or die 
Rückwirkung-Rückkehr is thereby indispensable, which Kuki calls volonté en puissance. It 
is only by way of this will that one can “overcome saṃsāra” (Jp. rinne) and thereby “attain 
nirvana.” 27
It is in this context that Kuki proposes a new reinterpretation of the myth of Sisyphus. 
Kuki disagrees with the prevailing opinion that sees this mythological figure as a victim 
of eternal punishment who repeatedly has to push a huge rock to the top of a mountain 
only to see it fall down a cliff. On the contrary, Kuki finds Sisyphus a happy man with a 
23 Itō 2014, pp. 127–29.
24 For an historical overview, see the explanation by Hayashima in Nakamura and Hayashima 1963–1964, vol. 3, 
pp. 339–64. For my detailed demonstration of this crucial point, see Inaga 2016, pp. 134–36.
25 KSZ, vol. 1, p. 60 (Japanese translation), p. 289 (French original). 
26 KSZ, vol. 1, p. 62 (Japanese), p. 287 (French).
27 KSZ, vol. 1, p. 60 (Japanese), p. 289 (French). “Volonté en puissance” may be literally translated as the “will 
in its potent state.” 
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good will, as he is “capable of perpetually repeating [his job] out of his un-satisfaction” 
(capable de la répétition perpétuelle de l’ insatisfaction).28 One of the reasons why Kuki was 
led to this nontraditional view of Sisyphus was the Great Kantō earthquake, which had 
devastated Japan’s capital area on 1 September 1923, “il y a 5 ans” (five years ago). As Kuki 
recalls it: “People asked me: why do you, the Japanese, construct an underground metro 
system, certainly destined to be destroyed by another huge earthquake which you have 
regularly at almost one hundred year intervals?” (On m’a demandé: pourquoi construisez-
vous le metro destiné à être toujours détruit à nouveau par un grand tremblement de terre, que 
vous avez périodiquement presque tous les cent ans?).29 Here we can see his nationalist profile 
d’entre-deux-guerres; an intellectual frustrated by the European negative view of Japan’s 
efforts for reconstruction. Kuki claims that without suffering, the will to overcome would 
never be actualized. In other words, without saṃsāra or metempsychosis, the fate of eternal 
repetition, there will be no attainment of enlightenment or nirvana. To put it another way: 
there is no enlightenment without eternal transmigration.
Curiously, within two years after Kuki’s premature death (1941), Albert Camus would 
publish his Le Mythe de Sisyphe (1942). One may wonder if Camus’s Sisyphe was not the 
reincarnation of Kuki’s philosophical figure partaking in the same existentialist “will” of 
positively assuming the ewige Wiederkehr-Wiederkunft, which Karl Löwith, Kuki’s close 
friend, studied around 1935–1936.30
5. Okakura’s English Reinterpretation of Daoism
We began this paper with Kuki’s reference to Okakura. Okakura sees in Japan a “museum 
of Asiatic civilization” where “all phases of the ideals of the past” constitute a constellation 
“in the spirit of living Advaitism which welcomes the new without losing the old.” 31 The 
same would be true of Kuki’s intellectual web, a network of Eastern wisdom constituting 
the very idea of the Eternal Return of Time. The thought of ancient Greece, such as that of 
the Pythagorean school, shows a high affinity with the circular structure of the recurrence 
of the soul, and it influenced Plato and Aristotle. Let us re-contextualize Kuki’s lecture 
on time in the intellectual milieu between the two world wars. By so doing we shall see 
the implicit relationship Kuki has entertained with contemporary Western philosophy by 
crossing cultural borders.
In his The Book of Tea, Okakura is indebted to Paul Carus, as the citation from the 
Daode jing 道徳経 is taken from Carus’s English translation published in 1898 by the 
Open Court Company, Chicago.32 The Chinese-English bilingual edition must have been 
28 KSZ, vol. 1, p. 63 (Japanese), p. 286 (French).
29 KSZ, vol. 1, p. 63 (Japanese), p. 286 (French).
30 Sugimoto Hidetarō and Mori Ichirō, among others, thought it possible that Camus read Kuki’s treatise. See 
Sugimoto 1981; Mori 2017, p. 131. In fact, it was Kuki himself who helped Karl Löwith escape to Japan from 
Nazi Germany, shortly after Löwith finished his manuscript on Nietzsche’s eternal return in Rome in 1936. 
Löwith could no longer return to Germany because of his Jewish wife, and stayed in Japan for five years from 
1936 to 1941 as lecturer at Tōhoku Imperial University before moving to the United States because of the 
outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. Let us also remember the fact that Jean-Paul Sartre 
knew of Kuki. On the implications of the similarity of Camus and Kuki’s interpretation of this myth, see 
note 52 below.
31 Okakura 2007, p. 13.
32 This note does not remain in the Dover 1964 edition. See Kinoshita Nagahiro’s critical edition of The Book of 
Tea (English, p. 23) and the editor’s note in Japanese, p. 41 (Kinoshita 2013).
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extremely helpful for Okakura, as he could easily check the original Chinese. In chapter 11 
of Carus’s translation, “The Function of The Non-Existent,” we read:
Clay is moulded into a vessel and on that which is non-existent [on its hollowness] 
depends the vessel’s utility. By cutting out doors and windows we build a house and on 
that which is non-existent [on the empty space] depends the house’s utility. Therefore, 
when the existence of things is profitable, it is the non-existent in them which renders 
them useful.33
In The Book of Tea, Okakura paraphrases this as follows:
This Lao Tzu illustrates by his favorite metaphor of the Vacuum. He claimed that only 
in vacuum lay the truly essential. The reality of a room, for instance, was to be found 
in the vacant space enclosed by the roof and walls, not in the roof and walls themselves. 
The usefulness of a water pitcher dwelt in the emptiness where water might be put, not 
in the form of the pitcher or the material of which it was made. Vacuum is all-potent 
because all-containing. In vacuum alone motion becomes possible.34 
Our existence in this world is like an empty vessel in which the soul of the ancestors takes 
its seat, to transmigrate, or navigate metempsychosis. The passage leaves behind a trace 
of the soul’s movement and transition, which reveals the way. Okakura formulates this by 
stating “[t]he Tao literally means a Path.” Then Okakura quotes directly from the original:
There is a thing which is all-containing, which was born before the existence of heaven 
and earth. How silent [ji 寂]! How solitary [liao 寥]! It stands alone and changes not. It 
revolves without danger to itself [zhouhang er budai 周行而不殆] and is the mother of 
the universe [tianxia mu 天下母]. I do not know its name and so call it the path [dao 道]. 
With reluctance, I call it the Infinite [da 大]. Infinity is the Fleeting [shi 逝], the 
Fleeting is the Vanishing [yuan 遠] , the Vanishing is the Reverting [fan 反].
According to Kinoshita Nagahiro, who recently published a critical edition of The Book 
of Tea, the corresponding part of Lao Zi’s original is chapter twenty-five, “Imaging the 
Mysterious.” A comparison with Paul Carus’s translation reveals how Okakura modified 
Carus’s direct rendering:
There is Being that is all-containing, which precedes the existence of heaven and earth. 
How calm it is! How incorporeal! Alone it stands and does not change. Everywhere 
it goes without running a risk, and can on that account become the world’s mother. I 
know not its name. Its character is defined as Reason [dao 道]. When obliged to give it 
a name, I call it Great [da 大]. The Great I call the Evasive [shi 逝]. The Evasive I call 
the Distant [yuan 遠]. The Distant I call the Returning [fan 反].35
33 Carus 1898, pp. 101–102.
34 Okakura 1964, p. 24; Kinoshita 2013 (English part), pp. 28–29.
35 Carus 1898, p. 109.
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These two translations are quite divergent in their choice of terminology found in the 
second half of the passage. (In the following, P.C. refers to Paul Carus’s translation, O.K. 
to Okakura Kakuzo’s rendering). “Great” (da 大) in Carus’s is replaced by “Infinite” in 
Okakura’s; “Evasive” (P.C.) (shi 逝) by “Fleeting” (O.K.); “Distant” (P.C.) (yuan 遠) by 
“Vanishing” (O.K.); and “Returning” ( fan 反) by “Reverting.” Thereby Okakura seems to 
be trying to convey a more coherent image of the idea to an ordinary readership. Okakura 
avoids terms with negative connotations (“evasive”) in their English rendering. He also 
uses “Infinite” instead of “Great” and “Vanishing” instead of “Distant.” These terms seem 
to be chosen to articulate the cosmic dimension with more precision. “Reverting” in place 
of “Returning” emphasizes “returning to a previous state” and also evokes the biological 
notion of “reverting to a former or ancestral type,” that is, atavism, and the juridical idea of 
“possess[ing] or succeed[ing] to property on the death of the present possessor” in the sense 
of “reversion.” 36 Curiously, Okakura’s translation choices make it easier to connect these 
basic Taoist ideas with the Buddhist idea of reincarnation or transmigration. Okakura then 
develops his own idea in the following passages, putting more emphasis on movement rather 
than a static state of things:
The Tao is in the Passage rather than the Path. It is the spirit of Cosmic Change,—
[sic] the eternal growth which returns upon itself to produce new forms. It recoils upon 
itself like the dragon, the beloved symbol of the Taoist. It folds and unfolds as do the 
clouds. The Tao might be spoken of as the Great Transition.37
“The Great Transition” seems to be reinterpreted or, better, taken back (“repris”) by Kuki 
to develop his own idea of metempsychosis. This is not mere speculation: it is known 
that during his nine-year stay in Europe Kuki confessed to having “read with absorption” 
English original editions of Okakura’s Ideals of the East and The Book of Tea and is said to 
have been “deeply moved.” 38 In light of our foregoing discussion, it must be said that there 
are undeniable traces of Okakura’s writing recurring in Kuki’s paper on “La notion du 
temps et la reprise sur le temps en Orient.” The French term “la reprise” even has a hidden 
connotation that Okakura’s Ideals of the Orient was repris or “taken back” by Kuki for his 
own benefit. We could also recognize that not only Okakura’s English books but also Kuki’s 
lectures in French have made positive contributions in the “migration” and “reversion” of 
ancient Eastern wisdom to Western modern scholarship.
6. The “Diamond Net of Indra” Around Kuki
When Okakura was consulting Paul Carus’s translation of Chinese Taoist classics, Suzuki 
Daisetsu 鈴木大拙, a famous theosophist and future Zen Buddhist master, had already 
arrived in Chicago in 1896 and would stay there until 1909. Prior to his stay in the U.S.A., 
Suzuki had already published a Japanese translation of Carus’s The Gospel of Buddha (1894) 
36 See, for example, Oxford English Dictionary, 11th edition, 2006. The historical context of the lexicology must 
be further taken into account, especially in the biological terminology of contemporary literature at the end 
of the nineteenth century.
37 Kinoshita 2013 (English transcription), p. 24.
38 Kuki 2001a, p. 15; Kuki 2001b, p. 21. 
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in 1895 and 1901,39 and he also translated into English Açvaghosha’s Discourse on the 
Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana (Jp. Daijō kishinron 大乗起信論).40 Carus’s translation 
of the Daode jing was also in reality done by him.41 Though we are not sure whether 
Okakura and Suzuki were in direct contact, we should note that they shared many personal 
connections. Recent scholarship in Japan suggests the relevance of this approach. It is also 
well known that Paul Carus had close ties with William James and Charles Sander Peirce. 
Itō Kunitake, professor emeritus of Kyoto University, has thoroughly investigated Peirce’s 
ideas of Cenopythagoreanism and continuum and William James’s concept of the pluralistic 
universe, seeing them as related to Kuki Shūzō’s notion of transmigration-metempsychosis.42 
Theosophy and American transcendentalists were closely related, and the young Suzuki was 
working in this circle, from which came part of Okakura Kakuzō’s thought as well as that 
of his spiritual son, Kuki Shūzō, thus constituting a constellation evoking Indra’s Infinite 
Net.
Andō Reiji, an intellectual historian and critic, has reconstructed the webs of 
intellectual life around the Open Court Publishing Company. Paul Carus translated Ernst 
Mach, and Andō convincingly demonstrates the influence of Mach’s analysis of Schielen or 
strabismus (Jp. shashi 斜視) on Orikuchi Shinobu 折口信夫, a modern Japanese national 
studies scholar.43 Mach’s Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum 
Psychischen (1886) was edited and translated into English as Contributions to the Analysis of 
Sensation (1897) by the Open Court Publishing Company. Mach’s idea of strabismus of the 
visual perception, Augenmuskelgleichgewichtsstörung, or the trouble with focus fixation in the 
eyes’ binocular vision, were applied and extrapolated by Orikuchi to auditory perception 
to give birth to the new idea of shachō 斜聴, a sort of “auditory strabismus,” in Orikuchi’s 
Shinto studies graduation thesis at Kokugakuin University in 1910.44 In Orikuchi’s 
understanding, shachō means unconscious or subconscious auditory perception.45 He further 
connected his idea to “atavism” and “nostalgia,” a curious amalgam of Ernst Häckel, and 
the auditory memory of the ancient soul transmitted through poetry by way of rhythmical 
rendering of the sound.
Kuki was also of the opinion that rhyme (Fr. rime) in poetic language can convey and 
transmit “nostalgia” (which stems from the German neologism of Sehnsucht) for one’s lost 
previous life, just like “past life regression” in psychiatry. This association also suggests the 
reason why Kuki in his final years before his premature death concentrated on the problem 
of contingency (also the topic of his PhD dissertation).46 Let us limit ourselves to just three 
points. First, in his paper on “rhyme in Japanese poetry,” Kuki declares that to regenerate 
39 Carus 1894. Japanese translation appears in SDZS vol. 25 as Budda no fukuin 仏陀の福音. The same volume 
of SDZS also contains Suzuki’s translation of Emmanuel Swedenborg’s Divine Love and Wisdom (1889; 
Shinchi to shin’ai 神智と神愛) as well as Paul Carus’s Amitabha (1906; Amida butsu 阿弥陀仏).
40 “Translator’s preface” pp. x–xiv (Suzuki 1900). Japanese translation: Suzuki 2002.
41 Suzuki was the only person who could have assisted Paul Carus’s Open Court translation work by directly 
referring to the Chinese original. Refer to the highly philological study by Yoshinaga (2014).
42 Itō 2006; Itō 2009. The idea of a parallel world in space may be logically interchangeable with that of 
reincarnation in time. For a detailed argument regarding this point, see Inaga 2016, pp. 132–33.
43 Mach 1886. English Translation: Mach 1897. Japanese translation: Mach 1971. 
44 Orikuchi 1996, pp. 120–36. 
45 Andō 2010, pp. 237–56. 
46 See Itō 2014; the book review by Tanaka 2015; and Obama 2015.
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and recall the tradition which we tend to forget (echoing aletheia, or Verborgenheit in 
Heidegger), “we only have to seize ourselves and secure our words through retrospection of 
our own tradition, by developing given possibilities into realities, by making a passage to put 
the hidden potentials (dynamis) into actualities (energeia).” 47 Clearly Kuki’s argument, based 
on Aristotelian terminology, is the same as his own discussion in “La Notion du temps et la 
reprise sur le temps en Orient” that we have examined above.
Second, Kuki states that the recurrence of the same rhyme in a poem repeats by 
its very recurrence the genealogy of the poetic tradition. Undoubtedly here is a circular 
structure which generates poiesis, resulting in a répétition infinie. This infinite repetition 
“put a poem in the present place, stepping on the same place as if in a standstill. Yet this 
enables the poem to concentrate itself on a moment of infinity which can be described as 
eternal present.” 48 Once again this is what he has formulated in French: “Vivons dans le 
temps perpétuel, dans l’Endlosigkeit en termes de Hegel. Trouvons l’Unendlichkeit dans 
l’Endlosigkeit, l’ infini dans l’ indéfini, l’ éternité dans la sucession sans fin” (Let’s live the 
perpetual time in “endlessness” to use Hegel’s term. Let’s find out the “unendness” in the 
“endlessness,” the “infinity” in the “indefinite,” the eternity in the endless succession).49
Third, and finally, Kuki sees in this repetition of rhyme “contingency converted into 
necessity”: what emerges as a chance image is fixated into a stable formality. To explain 
this recurrence in poietic, Kuki makes use of the Greek term palingenesia (palingenesis; Fr. 
palingénésie).50 According to Stoicism, the term means retour périodique éternel des mêmes 
événements (periodical return in eternity of the same events) or didactically renaissance des 
êtres ou des sociétés conçue comme source d’ évolution et de perfectionnement (renaissance of 
beings and societies conceived as the source of evolution and of accomplishment);51 in brief, 
metempsychosis.
7. “Plagiat par anticipation” or Affinity with Mishima Yukio52 
“Each drop of time that flows past seems to me as precious as a sip of good wine, and I have 
lost almost all interest in the spatial dimension of things.” Mishima Yukio 三島由紀夫, 
47 See “Nihonshi no ōin” 日本詩の押韻 (1931), in KSZ, vol. 4, p. 449. Handwritten revision of printed draft. 
Obama 2015, p. 200. 
48 Kuki Shūzō, “Bungaku no keijijōgaku” 文学の形而上学, in KSZ, vol. 4, p. 51. Obama 2015, p. 203.
49 Kuki 1928, p. 26; KSZ, vol. 1, pp. 62–286. Obama (2015, p. 204) comes to the same conclusion as mine. 
Obviously, Kuki here implicitly refers to Immanuel Kant’s Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797). See Takada 
2002, p. 146.
50 It is an open question whether Kuki had access to Pierre-Simon Ballanche’s (1776–1846) Essai de palingenésie 
sociale (1820) while he was in Paris. See also McCalla 1998. My thanks to Julian Strube who directed my 
attention to this point. Ballanche’s volume is not included in Kuki’s library that is preserved in Kōnan 
University Library.
51 See, for example, Robert 1978, vol.1, p. 1344. For literature contemporary to Kuki that elucidates the idea of 
palingenesia, refer to Chisholm 1911.
52 The author owes the term “plagiat par anticipation” (plagiarism by anticipation) to Pierre Bayard (2009). The 
pejorative connotation of “plagiat” in fact stems from a mistranslation of the classical Roman jurisdiction 
by the encyclopedists of the eighteenth century. See Maurel-Inder 2011, pp. 20–21. By referring to these 
metaphors, I wish to avoid the false question of plagiarism, seeing it as worthless. Consequently, Kuki’s 
possible influence on Albert Camus or Yukio Mishima is not the matter here. More important is the fact 
that Japanese authors like Kuki and Mishima repetitively returned to the idea of metempsychosis and relied 
upon it whenever they wanted to explain the phenomenon of transmigration to the Western public and its 




shortly prior to his sensational hara-kiri suicide, wrote the previous sentence to his colleague 
and Nobel Prize winner in literature Kawabata Yasunari 川端康成 on 4 July 1970. Almost 
the same phrase can be found in the last volume of Mishima’s final tetralogy, Hōjō no umi 
豊饒の海 (The Sea of Fertility). Needless to say, the tetralogy is based on the idea of the 
metempsychosis-transmigration of the soul.
A pluralistic universe and metempsychosis are not logically incompatible with each 
other.53 A pluralistic universe supposes that the same individual as “I” would also exist 
somewhere in the universe. If the distance separating the “I” and the other “I” is in the 
scale of several millions of light years, the notion of simultaneous coexistence practically 
loses meaning. One may well speculate regarding simultaneity beyond the velocity of light, 
and yet we shall see the limit of this speculation: ultimately, the possibility of a spatial 
coexistence of the “I” in plural parallel worlds jeopardizes the relevance of metempsychosis 
of the same soul scattered, here and there, on the vast lapses of time.54 Indeed, if “I” does 
exist in different places in the universe, it is no longer meaningful whether or not they 
exist simultaneously or in a different phase of the time span. Unless one can communicate 
with one’s other “I” (in synchronicity beyond the velocity of light, by way of telepathy, 
if you like), the reality would not change in any sense. However, what does it mean to 
“communicate” with one’s own identical self?
At the same time, we have already made it clear in examining the Nietzschean ewige 
Wiederkunft that the identity of the soul in transmigration cannot be guaranteed so long 
as the soul in question is conscious of its own reincarnation. If one is conscious of one’s 
reincarnation, one would no longer be strictly identical with one’s ancestral existence 
because of the presence of this awareness. Honda Shigekuni, one of the protagonists of 
Mishima’s trilogy, clearly states this fact: “It seems as if transmigration consists of a sterile 
effort of proving what you can never verify.” 55
What is at stake here is no longer the relevance or irrelevance of the idea of 
metempsychosis. Rather, it is the very notion of identity (which has been taken for granted, 
and heretofore unconditionally posited) that should be questioned. Let us set up a (pseudo-)
syllogism. Primo: logically (in the sense of formal logic) we cannot negate the probability 
of metempsychosis. Secundo: metempsychosis puts the presupposed notion of identity in 
question. A conclusion that can be deduced from these double premises is that the very 
identicalness of the notion of “identity” must be reexamined.56 In fact, the logical and 
ontological foundation of this “sameness” is questioned here. Following the same line of 
53 For a detailed demonstration, see Inaga 2016, pp. 122–36. I hereafter limit myself to the core argument of 
the question while leaving aside the remaining debatable problems.
54 “[V]arious reincarnations extending over a period of time are no more significantly linked to one another 
than the lives of all the individuals who happen to be alive at the same given moment. In other words, I felt 
that in such a case the concept of reincarnation would be practically meaningless” (Mishima 1972, p. 230). 
Original Japanese: Mishima 1977a, p. 246.
55 Mishima 1977a, p. 246. “And so it’s obvious that it would be pointless to try to produce any proof of 
transmigration” (Mishima 1972, p. 230).
56 Here I am intentionally bridging a logical question and an ontological question. The logical evidence 
regarding the idea of “identity” is sapped by the ontological uncertainty of the identical self. The latter 
cannot be guaranteed in front of the non-verifiable yet imaginable possibility of transmigration. Kuki himself 
concentrated his thinking on this enigma in his final PhD dissertation, The Problem of Contingency (1935) 
(Kuki 1935). A discussion of this work belongs, however, to another study. Refer to the recent publications 
mentioned in note 4. 
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thinking, Mishima comes to the conclusion that reincarnation/paligenesis/metempsychosis 
must exist de juri; otherwise—and obviously this is a tautology—humanity would not be 
able to liberate itself from its passive destiny.
Everything exists through alaya, and since it does, all things are. But what if alaya 
is extinguished./But the world must exist!/Therefore, alaya consciousness is never 
extinguished. As in the cascade, the water of every moment is different, yet the stream 
flows in torrential and constant movement./Thus alaya consciousness flows eternally 
in order to make the world exist./For the world must at all costs exist! [sic]/But why?/ 
Because only by the existence of the world—world of illusion—is man given the 
chance to enlightenment.57
This conviction shows a striking affinity with the “will” that Kuki proposed (in his 
reinterpretation of Sisyphus): “Without saṃsāra or metempsychosis, fate of eternal repetition, 
there will be no attainment of enlightenment, nirvana.” There is no enlightenment without 
eternal transmigration. I wonder if Mishima referred to Kuki’s reflection on metempsychosis 
when writing his final trilogy. Whether this is the case or not, a kind of transmigration of 
the idea is potentially (that is, beyond the realm of verification, by nature) taking place from 
Kuki to Mishima.
8. Rhyme in the Ise Shrines: In the Guise of a Conclusion 
One typical case of metempsychosis is practiced not in Japanese Buddhism but rather in 
the ritual succession of the Ise Shrines. Every twenty years, the old wooden structures 
are torn down and replaced by the next generation, identical in form and located next to 
them. At the interval of twenty years, the old buildings disappear and the new buildings 
appear, composing an oscillation with a rhythmical undulation. The metaphor of the rime-
rhyme that Kuki imagined in the poetry may find its physical reincarnation in this ritual 
replacement of the shikinen sengū 式年遷宮. The soul of the collective spirit of a nation is 
supposedly transmigrating through this interminable abolition and reconstitution, putting 
into question the materialism of the physical idea of conservation. The chrono-political 
manipulation of identity lies at the core of this cosmic idea of transmigration.58
57 Mishima 1977b, pp. 160–61. Mishima 1970, p. 126.
58 Inaga 2012. It should be noted that Kuki was among the faculty members of Kyoto University when Bruno 
Taut, the German architect, came to Japan to visit the Ise Shrines at the suggestion of his acquaintances at the 
university in 1934. After this visit, Bruno Taut would become the main proponent of ideas regarding the Ise 
Shrines, such as metempsychosis and eternal permanence in impermanence. Connecting Kuki’s discussion of 
regeneration through rhyme with recurrence of the past at the Ise Shrines is relevant in light of the analyses 
of Kuki’s poetics by Gōda Masato (2017) and Kushida Jun’ichi (2017). A full discussion of this issue will 
be left for another study. I would like to stress that not only Kuki but also Karl Löwith and Bruno Taut all 
took special interest in the idea of “ewige Wiederkunft” in their contact with Japan, and that an intellectual 
constellation—or a kind of “web”—had been formed by the relationships among them in the “magnetic 
field,” which Japan constituted in the late 1920s and early 1930s as a cultural and geopolitical “topos.” It 
must also be added that the question of metempsychosis as well as that of contingency undermines the logical 
distinction between simultaneous and independent events, thus dangerously sapping the very foundation of 
rational thinking. Sakabe (2002, pp. 1–17), Washida (2002), and Matsuoka (2017) among others see in this 
perilous zone (which destroys stable categorical thinking, indicates the limit of the Reason-Vernunft, and 
opens up the field of poetics composed of incontrollable word play and rhyme), a yet-to-be-explored aspect of 
Kuki’s writing, a zone which obviously lies beyond the reach of the present paper. 
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We have thus far sketched in haste the case of palingenesis in and around Kuki Shūzō. 
This story serves as one of the parallel worlds located at the fringe of a border-crossing 
history of ideas. Like the pluralistic universe defined by William James, or the infinite 
web of Indra, these parallel worlds reflect each other and mutually elucidate the notion of 
metempsychosis which transmigrates not only within the circle of a particular school of 
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